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Abstract 
The paper presents evidence on the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes in Hungary 
referring to the 2006 system and a hypothetical flat tax reform. For this, a microsimulation model is 
used, which is based on a matched sample of an income and a consumption survey and 
administrative tax records. The Hungarian budget receives more revenues from VAT than from 
PIT. This has major implications on equity, as while PIT is progressive, VAT is regressive, 
imposing a higher tax burden on low-income households. We highlight the importance of tax 
allowances. The absolute amount of total tax allowances tends to increase with income, and the 
share of allowances within total incomes is around 5-7% in all income groups, except the top fifth, 
where it declines. Targeting is thus inadequate, and it is especially so in case of child support. 
Family tax allowance reaches the bottom decile only to a limited extent. This is in sharp contrast 
with the universal child benefit, which is well targeted to the poorest. The second part explores the 
likely impact of the introduction of a flat tax, where VAT and PIT rates are set at 20%, and a tax 
free bracket for low incomes is kept. We show that a budget neutral solution would have a largely 
regressive effect, where 70% of the population would lose, with a minority on the top of the 
distribution gaining. 
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1. INTRODUCTIONi 
In Hungary, discussions on economic policy priorities often appear misguided. A typical argument 
is that less state and less redistribution is economically superior to more redistribution, which 
appears to be a simplistic backlash to the paternalist model of the socialist economy. Key indicators 
used in setting policy priorities are the ratio of spending or the ratio of revenues compared to the 
GDP. Yet little is known on the impacts of the structure of public spending and that of revenues, be 
it either short term or long term, and perhaps even less known is the interplay of the various specific 
instruments. Yet an “opposite” group of social scientists argue for increased social spending. Many 
of these arguments, however, disregard the opportunity cost of spending or the existence of budget 
constrains as such. A “caring state is a spending state” may be the logo of such argument. We 
believe that the focus of the debate needs to be fundamentally reshuffled, with more focus on 
empirical evidence and on microeconomic effects. We aim to promote this process with the 
presentation of research evidence on the redistributive impacts of the tax and benefit system as a 
whole. For this, we will use the national tax-benefit microsimulation model of the Ministry of 
Finance. 
Little is known on the effects of the tax-benefit system on the income distribution in Hungary. 
Empirical evidence, using Euromod, the European tax-benefit microsimulation model and the 
national models of Hungary and Poland compares the 2001 system of Hungary with those of EU15 
countries and Poland (Sutherland, Levy and Paulus, 2006). The study finds that the distribution of 
original incomes is rather unequal, with a shape that is rather similar to that of the UK and Ireland, 
in contrast to the more equal distribution of Austria and Germany The role of the state in Hungary, 
however, is rather different from these Anglo-Saxon countries: due to its more generous public 
pension scheme, a considerable share of the benefits go to the top fifth as well, although to a much 
smaller extent than e.g. in France, Austria or Polandii. The tax system also seems to play a specific 
role in Hungary: taxes (including tax allowances), seem to be rather efficient in raising the incomes 
of those in the second to fourth deciles, in contrast to all other countries, where the role of direct 
taxes is smaller and varies less in the bottom half of the income distribution. Contrary to popular 
belief, the tax burden on the top fifth seems to be rather close to the lower end of the range in the 
EU15. Taxes and contributions range between 22% (Portugal) and 46% (Denmark) as a proportion 
of gross incomes of the top quintile, while the ratio is 27% in Hungary. These comparative figures, 
however, do not highlight the role of specific benefits, neither those of tax allowances, and are 
constrained to distributional analysis by income quintiles, rather than other demographic 
characteristics. 
Hungary appears to be a useful case study not only for the lack of detailed national evidence so far. 
Inequality has increased considerably during the years following economic transformation, both in 
terms of material resources but also in subjective well-being (Tóth 2005, Lelkes 2006). With the 
joining of the European Union, the country has officially become part of the EU’s decision making 
process, including increased monitoring and the production of social indicators. Yet little is known 
on many policy instruments and their social impacts, for example tax allowances, and general 
welfare typologies, such as the much cited one of Esping-Andersen (1990) may not be applicable or 
particularly helpful for a potential European harmonisation (Lelkes 2000). 
Flat taxes seems to be particularly popular in much of Eastern Europe, and have been introduced in 
the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Slovakia, Serbia, Romania, Macedonia, although with a 
varied definition on what is actually meant by flat tax. In many of these countries, personal income 
tax schemes sustained a tax free bracket for those with low incomes often with specific child tax 
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credits. In addition, a social security contribution is often added to the seemingly low income tax 
rates, constituting a higher total tax burden in an economic sense. The evidence on the impact of 
these reforms seems to be sparse, partly because it proved to be difficult to disentangle the effect of 
flat tax reform from other parallel policy reforms, or external macroeconomic effects, and partly, 
because the lack of adequate micro data hinders such analyses. In Russia, for example, where 
revenues boosted following the tax reform, economic growth and high oil prices are likely to have 
played a dominant role rather than changing tax compliance, according to the IMF.  
The introduction of a flat tax scheme is a recurring theme in Hungarian politics as well, although 
with not much reference to the details of such reform. The proponents believe that a significant 
simplification of the current scheme would increase tax compliance, and therefore would ultimately 
enable the reduction of the tax burden. Some also regard this tax scheme fairer than the current 
(progressive) one. The underlying core issue, however, seems  to be the level of taxes and the 
complexity of the tax system as such, rather than the rates themselves. We argue that a flat tax 
scheme is not a precondition for the achievement of these goals, as the complexity of the system 
does not arise from the number of rates, but rather from the number of exemptions and the complex 
rules of defining the tax base. We show that the introduction of a flat income tax with a budget 
neutral solution (on a short run) would have a largely regressive effect, where the majority of the 
population would lose, with a minority on the top of the distribution gaining. These adverse effects 
need to be born in mind when discussing policy alternatives.  
First we briefly present the TÁRSZIM2005iii model, including the underlying dataset, then analyse 
the redistributive effects of the tax system and that of cash benefits of 2006. The concluding section 
presents the potential impact of the introduction of a flat tax system in Hungary. 
 
2. THE HUNGARIAN  MICROSIMULATION MODEL: TÁRSZIM 
In many countries microsimulation techniques have been widely used in government and the 
academia, so there is little need to prove the legitimacy of it. For example, in the UK the Treasury 
and the Department for Work and Pensions publish their results regularly during the debate of the 
budget. EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit model has a whole network of researchers across 
Europe, with a diverse set of research resultsiv. Many governments in Eastern Europe, including e.g. 
Estonia, Poland, Slovenia have already commissioned the construction of such a model, although 
interestingly often at the initiation of independent researchers, who were well aware of the benefits 
and methodology of the techniquev.  
Microsimulation modelling has not so far been used in Hungary to prepare economic policy 
decisions, despite some earlier initiatives by the CSO and TÁRKIvi. It was only in 2004, with a 
supportive finance minister, and the establishment of a new research unit, that the use of the 
technique became possible. The tax-benefit model, named TÁRSZIM, was developed by the 
TÁRKI social research institute, and was commissioned by the Ministry of Finance. 
2.1 Model features 
The model includes personal income tax (PIT); tax allowances; indirect taxes (VAT); and the major 
social benefits (for details see (Benedek and Lelkes, 2005) and TÁRSZIM2005 Manual). As is the 
case for all such models, the parameters of all these policy instruments can be set according to 
actual or hypothetical scenarios, including for example the tax rates, and the entitlement criteria. 
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Similar to other existing tax-benefit microsimulation models, it only refers to the cash part of 
redistribution, thus ignores the consumption of public goods or benefits in kind, such as health care 
or education. The reason is that the pricing of these social services is complex on an individual 
level, the information on the consumption of the specific items is inadequate, and the implications 
of their consumption on inequality is often unclearvii. 
The model is able to simulate all central government taxes and benefits, but not local government 
ones. There are 3200 local governments in Hungary, with varying policies, so the impact of their 
practices (and potential policy changes) cannot possibly be modelled with the available dataset. 
Household revenues from local sources, however, constitute part of total incomes, as they are part 
of the income survey.  
The unit of impact assessment can be the household or the individual. The model thus allows to 
analyse the interaction between household members. We can follow how changes in individual 
incomes (as result of policy changes) add up on a household level. This is of major relevance, as the 
unit of policy is often the individual, while incomes are shared within the household. Depending on 
the household composition, e.g. whether jobless people tend to be concentrated in jobless 
households or rather live with employed spouses, the impact of policies may vary a great deal. 
TÁRSZIM is a static model, therefore it is suitable for assessing “day-after” effects, but it is not 
suitable for assessing behavioural responses in the area of labour market activity, and only to a very 
limited extent is it capable of assessing changes in consumption patterns.  
2.2 The database 
The database consists of three different datasets, an income and a consumption survey and an 
administrative data on tax records, which have been merged with probabilistic matching, based on 
region, age, income decile, and gender. The merged dataset thus includes information on income, 
consumption and taxation, beyond the essential socio-demographic information on households.viii 
The core dataset is the 2004 TÁRKI Monitor data, which contains individual demographic, labour 
market and household characteristics and income data of 2325 households and their members for 
2003. This is supplemented by the 2003 database of the CSO (Central Statistics Office) Household 
Budget Survey containing detailed consumption data for about 8 thousand households. The third 
database is a random sample of almost 62 thousand observations, compiled by APEH (the Tax and 
Financial Control Administration), from the 2003 personal income tax returns.  
The core dataset thus contains data from 2003. For analyses that relate to any year other than 2003 
the basic settings need to be adjusted. Multipliers (adjusting for nominal growth between 2003 and 
2006) are applied for the model used in this study. Multipliers regarding income items are 
calculated by the experts of the Ministry of Finance, while the price indices applied to consumption 
items are based on CSO data. 
The VAT estimates of the model seem rather flat across income groups due to two types of errors. 
First, there was a rather high unit non-response rate in the original dataset, the CSO Household 
Budget Survey. The unit non-response was higher among the well-off, but unfortunately the actual 
extent of the problem is not revealed by the Statistical Office (CSO, 2004: pp. 29.). Second, the 
model assumes full tax compliance, in other words, that everyone pays the tax due on each HUF 
spent on consumption. As a result of all distortions the model seems to underestimate total VAT by 
25% and VAT payment by higher income groups even more. As a result, we expect VAT to be 
more progressive in reality than estimated by the model. 
In the next session we present the redistribution of the 2006 tax and benefit system in Hungary. 
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3. EFFECTS OF THE 2006 TAX AND BENEFIT SYSTEM ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The poverty reduction effect of benefits is compelling: if the government suspended all cash 
benefits, poverty increased from 13% to 33% among the working age population, according to 2003 
data, using a 60% of the national median income as a poverty threshold. Among the elderly, defined 
as those above the age of 65, poverty would multiply: from 9% to 67%. Similar calculations can be 
made for specific cash benefits, such as universal child benefit, unemployment benefit (e.g. Förster-
Tóth 1997, 2001). These calculations are appropriate for presenting the effect of benefits on specific 
groups of the society and can demonstrate the relative importance of certain benefits. The limitation 
of these analyses is that they can be done only ex post, once data is available on past years, and that 
they can be done only for very specific policy instruments, disregarding the interaction of these. 
Therefore, their role in decision-making is limited. As opposed to these methods, microsimulation 
can be used for a comprehensive analysis of various instruments, and can be used for testing future 
policy scenarios. 
3.1 Parameters of the tax and benefit systemix 
Taxes on incomes: 
• In 2006 a two-tier personal income tax regime was in place, with the following tax rates: 
 0 –  1,550,000 18% 
1,550,001 –   38% 
• capital incomes are subject to 10%, 20%, 27% or 35% tax rates; 
• the rates of employee pension contributions and health insurance contributions are 8.5% 
and 4%, respectively; 
• employee tax allowance and supplementary tax allowance ensure that the minimum 
wage is tax exempt; 
• family tax allowance applies to those with 3 or more children and may be shared 
between parents; 
o other tax allowances refer to repayment of subsidised mortgage loans, life insurance and 
pension savings, adult education, charitable donations, etc. 
 
Taxes on goods: 
• there is a motor vehicle registration fee; 
• the normal VAT rate is 20%, with a preferential rate of 15%. Certain products and 
services are subject to an even lower VAT rate; 
• excise duty is levied on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and fuel; 
 
Major benefits: 
• means tested: regular social assistance and housing benefit 
• universal:  child benefit and other family benefits (maternity benefit, etc.) 
• gas-price subsidy 
• other, insurance based benefits: pension, unemployment benefits, etc.  
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3.2 Redistribution in the 2006 tax and benefit system 
First we analyse the redistribution effects of the tax and benefits system on the total population, that 
is, on all households. Besides taxpayers this category includes children, pensioners, the unemployed 
and other economically inactive groups. Figure 1 shows the tax liabilities and the social benefits of 
households (including gas price subsidy) as a percentage of disposable income. Substantial 
redistribution can be observed: tax payment accounts for a smaller percentage of disposable income 
than social benefits in the lower half of the distribution, i.e. the state collects smaller amounts from 
the first five deciles in the form of direct taxes than it returns to them in the form of benefits. Yet 
from the seventh decile upward households pay more to the budget than they receive as benefits. 
However if social security contributions are also taken into account, which finance mostly insurance 
based benefits, then the middle income groups are net financers of the system. It is also worth 
noting that although the top 3 deciles receive a substantial part of the benefits, it only counts for 2-
5% of their disposable incomes (Figure 2). 
1. Income taxes and cash benefits across income groups. Taxes (PIT), social security contributions 
(ssc) and benefits as a ratio of disposable income, %, households  
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Note: benefits = universal child benefit + maternity benefits + gas price subsidy + regular social assistance + 
housing benefit 
Figure 2 shows that a great proportion of benefits (plus family tax allowance) is allocated to the 
richer half of the population: the top five deciles get over 40% of the benefits. The bottom two 
decile groups get no more than 30% of the total spending. This may not be a problem per se, given 
that the welfare system’s main function is not poverty alleviation per se, but also the smoothing of 
individual’s incomes over the life cycle. Nevertheless, this ratio is not known and worth to be noted. 
Note also, that this figure does not say anything on the poverty alleviation effect of these transfers, 
nor does it include local means-tested social assistance. A final word on the results of the table: the 
decrease at the middle of the distribution is due to the fact that a high proportion of pensioners can 
be found here, who receive only a negligible share of the family benefits.   
 
bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. top
Household equivalent income deciles 
(PIT+ssc)/income 
benefits/income 
10% 
0% 
5% 
35% 
30% 
25% 
20% 
15% 
 PIT/income 
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2. Where does budget spending go? Distribution of the total sum of benefits and family tax allowance 
among deciles of households  
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
There is a great difference between the „intended” and actual progressivity of the PIT system, due 
to the impact of tax allowances and tax credits. This part of the analysis was conducted on the group 
of taxpayers, who make up less than 50% of the total population. In Figure 3 the per capita gross 
income and tax liability are arranged by net income, along with the implicit tax rate calculated as a 
ratio of the two. The difference between the two lines highlights the redistribution effect of tax 
allowances. The dashed line, the ratio of calculated tax to gross income, shows the rate of tax that 
would be borne by individuals in the various deciles without the tax allowances. This varies 
between 17% and 25% for the various groups, which is in line with the tax scheme. The implicit tax 
rate, indicated by the continuous line on the graph, which shows the ratio of actual tax liability to 
gross income taking tax allowances into account, is much more progressive and is more favourable 
to the less affluent groups of society. This rate is below 5% in the lower deciles, and then gradually 
rises along the income, until finally, in the top decile, it is up to 25%, which is almost as high as the 
rate calculated without the tax allowances. This suggests that the progressivity of the PIT system is 
rather weak when only the impact of tax brackets is considered, but becomes rather strong due to 
the effect of tax allowances. 
The slight increase in the 2nd and 3rd decile groups is due to the fact that most of the self-employed 
belong here based on their declared income and they are not eligible for the most substantial tax 
allowance, the employee tax allowance. 
 
0%
2%
4%
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8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. top
Household equivalent income deciles 
 benefits+fam.tax allow. 
linear distribution 
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3. Gross income and tax liability, and the calculated implicit tax rate, 2006 
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Note: implicit tax rate = actual tax liability/gross income (i.e. including tax allowances); 
calculated liability = tax calculated by the tax scheme + capital taxes (i.e. without tax allowances) 
 
The Hungarian budget relies heavily on indirect taxes, and received about 63% higher amount from 
VAT than from PIT in 2006 (Ministry of Finance, 2007), a typical phenomenon of economies with 
high tax evasion as the collection of the former is somewhat easier for the administration. Burden 
from both taxes falls on households (although note that some of the VAT is paid by corporations), 
but the progressivity is rather different. While PIT is progressive, VAT is actually regressive, in the 
sense that the share of VAT within incomes decreases as income increases (Figure 4). The reason of 
this phenomenon is that rich households differ from poor ones in terms of their savings rather than 
their spending. Redistribution via VAT is further complicated by the fact that goods under the 
preferential VAT rate (e.g. basic food items) are consumed in a similar amount by the rich and poor 
households, therefore the preferential rate subsidises all households to a similar extent. The 
progressivity of the VAT scheme might be also influenced by unit non-response in the consumption 
survey, as discussed before. 
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4. PIT and indirect tax (VAT and excise duties) liability of households in forints and ratio of the 
disposable income 
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
The Hungarian data correspond to the theoretical propositions. In one of the first articles on this 
topic, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) argued that in an optimum income tax regimex – if certain 
conditions are met with regard to the preferences of consumers – there is no need for indirect taxes 
(which may reduce the efficiency of the system). However it has been shown by several authors 
(e.g. Saez (2000)) that the information asymmetry between government and individuals still 
necessitates the application of indirect taxes. Another argument for indirect taxes is poor tax 
compliance, which precludes an optimum income tax regime. In the case of poor taxpayer morale, it 
is cheaper and easier to collect indirect taxes. Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1994) come to the 
conclusion that an optimum tax regime comprises a combination of direct and indirect taxes. With 
indirect taxes, however, for the sake of fairness, higher rates should be imposed on goods consumed 
more often by higher-income groups of society.  
Although tax allowances seem to reach the poorest among the taxpayers, the picture is rather 
different when we focus on the disadvantaged within the whole population. The reason is rather 
intuitive: only a few households have labour income in the bottom decile, thus they cannot (fully) 
deduct tax allowances. In addition, pensioners, the majority of whom belong to the 4th to 7th deciles, 
are not entitled to most of these benefits either. On the other hand cash benefits do reach the 
poorest. It should be noted however that not all forms of tax allowances have poverty alleviation 
purposes, and some of them are not meant to be targeted to the poor. Figure 5 shows that the bottom 
decile receives a substantial amount of cash benefits, but cannot exercise tax allowances due to their 
low incomes. The second decile however can use both forms of support already. Nevertheless main 
beneficiaries of the tax allowances are in the top third of the distribution. It may not be surprising 
though, as tax allowances include preferential treatment of repayment of subsidised mortgage loans, 
life and pension savings, adult education, etc., which are often associated with the more affluent 
groups.  
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5. Tax allowances and benefits per households in the deciles  
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Employee tax allowance and family tax allowance are supposed to serve social purposes, but they 
do not reach the poorest decile sufficiently (Figure 6) either. The employee tax allowance is to 
guarantee that the minimum wage is exempt from PIT, and it is tapered away at higher income 
levels (the maximum amount of the allowance decreases to zero between 1.35 and 2 million HUF). 
Families with 3 or more children are eligible for family tax allowance. High proportion of these 
families belong to the lower deciles, therefore the targeting of this allowance is better, as a lower 
proportion goes to the upper half of the distribution, however the bottom 10 percent receives a 
lower proportion of this type of benefit than the second decile.  
6. Average value of employee tax allowance and family tax allowance per households in various 
income deciles  
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Note: the so-called “supplementary tax allowance” is added to employee tax allowance as they serve a 
similar purpose  
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The number of children is one of the main risk factors of poverty in Hungary. The universal child 
benefit, with its progressive amountsxi, is therefore rather successful in reaching the poorest income 
groups. In addition, this cash benefit is better targeted than tax allowances, which often cannot be 
fully deducted by those with low incomes. For example families with 4 or more children in the 
bottom decile group get about 50% of their total disposable income from this source, but even 
among the poorest 2-child families child support counts for about one third of their income. 
Although child support succeeds in reaching poor households well, the proportion of this benefit 
going to the upper half of the distribution is also remarkable, simply due to its universal nature.      
 
7. Proportion of the universal child benefit within total household income by income deciles and by 
number of children 
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
 
4. EFFECTS OF A FLAT TAX SYSTEM ON INCOMES: GAINERS AND LOSERS 
Flat tax appears to be a popular policy idea in Eastern Europe. The majority of Eastern European 
countries seem to have introduced such a scheme, starting with the Baltic states in the mid 1990s, 
followed by Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia, Serbia, Romania, 
Macedonia later. Albania is planning to do so from 2008. Poland, and Greece is also considering 
such a move. In many of the countries it meant a simplification of the scheme, e.g. with the 
elimination of tax allowances, but also the lowering of average tax burden, although not in all of 
them. Lithuania, for example, set the flat rate at the highest bracket of the existing regime, 33%. 
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8. Flat tax systems in Europe 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_tax, Retrieved on 10 July 2007 
 
What is actually meant by “flat tax”, varies a great deal per country. Very few countries have a flat 
tax scheme, where all types of incomes are taxed equally, including earnings, capital income and 
corporate income, and even less do tax consumptions to the same extent. Perhaps most strikingly, 
however, it would impose flat rates on people, irrespective of their income levels (and their abilities 
to conceal incomes, e.g. via transfers to foreign countries), thus giving up the role of the state in 
redistributing incomes via the tax system. This may save administrative costs, as all redistribution is 
costly, as claimed by Okun (1975) in his picturesque image of the leaky bucket. None of these 
countries, however, go for the “pure” version of it. In most cases, there are tax free limits for people 
with low incomes, at times also for families. Flat tax reform may have its appeal as it serves as an 
opportunity for simplifying the tax scheme, primarily from numerous tax allowances accumulated 
over long years due to interest groups rent-seeking. Simplicity saves takes administration costs and 
increases compliance.  
Albeit the international popularity of the scheme, little is yet known on its impact on macro 
performance and on tax compliance. One of the success stories is Russia, where tax revenues have 
increased by 25% following the 2001 introduction of the scheme. Ivanova, Keen and Klemm (2005) 
find that the reform has probably increased tax compliance considerably (by one third) in Russia, it 
is not clear to what extent it is attributable to the parametric reform and to the increased law 
enforcement. The authors also highlight that oil revenues have increased massively in this period, 
resulting fast economic growth, thus producing greater tax revenues. Slovakia has introduced flat 
taxes as part of an overall structural reform, including pensions, social transfers, education, health 
care and the tax system. They introduced a uniform 19% tax rate (replacing 18 different rates), 
widened the tax base, and decreased, but not eliminated the progressivity of the tax system. The 
reception of the reform was positive by the international financial market, reflected in the improved 
country credit rating. On the other hand, there is no empirical evidence on the behavioral impact of 
the reform.  
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4.1 Microsimulation results 
Referring to Hungary, we conducted a ‘what if’ type of analysis, where the tax regime parameters 
are entirely hypothetical. We take a tax regime that is somewhat similar to the one introduced in the 
course of tax reform in Slovakia, simpler than the existing Hungarian system: all tax rates (PIT and 
VAT) are set at 20%, there are no special tax rates but all incomes are combined and the flat rate is 
applied, the only allowance remaining is the employer tax allowance, the gas price subsidy is 
removed, but the means tested benefits, family benefits and insurance based benefits (including e.g. 
pensions) remain. The budgetary effects are not explored, yet we mean to present an example that 
is, on the whole, likely to be revenue neutral for the budget. 
As mentioned before, the model is a static one, so it does not take account of behavioural responses. 
The economic outcomes are likely to be altered by behavioural responses. The virtue of such 
analysis is not prediction of long term outcomes, rather to show the day after effect, which is then 
likely to lead to certain actions. The policy relevance of such analysis is different, but equally 
relevant. 
A 20% single tax rate would benefit primarily the higher-income groups. With the exception of the 
top fifth of the income distribution, there are no major differences in the PIT tax liability, the taxes 
paid by the richest would, however, be reduced substantially (Figure 9). VAT would increase in all 
households and the gainers of PIT and VAT changes together would be the rich while losers would 
be the poor.   
9. Increase in PIT and VAT liabilities of households compared to the 2006 system (2006 vs 20% flat 
tax) by income deciles 
  
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
 
In terms of disposable income, the poorest would be affected worst by such a tax simplification 
(Figure 10). On the whole, only the top third of the distribution would benefit significantly, while 
people in the bottom half would be left with smaller disposable incomes.  
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10. Equivalent disposable incomes in 2006 and after the tax simplification and % change 
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Such a simplified tax system would benefit about 15% of households, while 15% of households 
would be worse off than at present. Income would not change substantially for the remaining 
households (Figure 11). Households gaining would be found at the top deciles while the proportion 
of losers is above 10% in each decile, but is the highest at the middle of the distribution. Therefore, 
the introduction of such a tax regime would reduce the extent of income redistribution. 
11. Distribution of households gaining/losing as a result of the changes 
 
Source: own calculations with TÁRSZIM2005 
Notes: 
Worse off: whose per capita disposable income has dropped by more than 2%;  
No change: whose per capita disposable income has not changed by more than 2%;  
Better off: whose per capita disposable income has grown by more than 2%. 
The political discussion and the debate of the theme should therefore be specific about the priorities 
and the parameters of such a reform, and any decision should be preceded by impact analyses of 
different kinds. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper presented evidence on the redistributive impacts of the current tax and benefit system and 
the possible effects of the introduction of a hypothetical 20% flat tax system in Hungary.  
There is little evidence on the size and impact of tax allowances, and they do not constitute part of 
the annual budgetary process. We showed that amount of tax allowances is substantial, and this type 
of benefits does not reach the poorest but rather the middle of the distribution. Cash benefits have a 
greater equalising role as they reach the poorest third of the population and significantly increase 
the disposable income of these groups.  
According to our calculations a Slovakian type flat tax system would mostly benefit the affluent 
households, while poorer losers are likely to lose out. The main reason is the changes in the income 
tax rates, with an increase at the lower and a decrease at the higher end, but the increase of the 
preferential VAT rate also plays a role.  
Future research options will significantly broaden by the incorporation of Hungary into the 
EUROMOD the European tax-benefit model (on Euromod see: Immervol, O’Donoghue and 
Sutherland, 1999; on the feasibility of enlargement Euromod to Hungary, see: Varga, Gabor, Szivos 
and Vajda 2006 ). Hungary is one of the four countries selected for the enlargement of the model as 
part of an ongoing project. The new version of the Euromod model would enable cross-country 
comparisons, including East and West, old and new member states. 
An interesting novel research area could be the estimation of the impact of tax evasion on income 
distribution. Microsimulation results, where the actual degree of tax compliance is taken into 
account rather than assuming full compliance, would provide more accurate insights into the 
restributive system as a whole. 
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ii
 In Hungary, benefits make up 10% of gross incomes among the top quintile, while this ratio is about 20% in Austria 
and France. 
iii
 TÁRSZIM2005 model is the product of TÁRKI Social Research Inc., Budapest – the software was developed by 
VirgoSystems Kft. -, financed by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Social Affairs, using the datasets of APEH, 
CSO and TÁRKI. 
iv
 On the potential applications of EUROMOD see the publication series at 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/publications/emodwp.php. 
v
 For an overview of microsimulation models in Eastern Europe, see Lelkes (2007). 
vi
 On previous microsimulation modelling in Hungary see Szivós-Rudas-Tóth (1998), description of earlier model 
version of TÁRSZIM is presented on the relevant web page of TÁRKI:  http://www.tarki.hu/research/mikro/index.html. 
See also Redmond (1999) on the results of the common model of CSO and University of Cambridge. 
vii
 Including the consumption of health care into someone’s cash incomes would imply that people who are sicker would 
be shown as richer, simply due to the consumption of these services, with no obvious consequences of this „richness” 
on their well-being or utility. 
viii
 A detailed technical description of the compilation of the data file can be found in the Handbook of TÁRSZIM2005 
Professional v3.2. 
ix
 For a detailed description of the Hungarian tax and benefit system see Benedek, Firle and Scharle (2006), and the 
structure of government taxes and spending, see Benedek, Lelkes, Scharle and Szabo 2006. 
x
 An optimum tax regime is characterised by the following: as a result of market failures (external effects) the state 
needs to intervene in market mechanisms by applying taxes, i.e. the state needs to raise tax revenue. An optimum 
arrangement among the different tax systems is one that entails the smallest distortion or social cost (including primarily 
‘dead weight loss’). For more details on the subject see: James Alm (1996). 
xi
  The amount of benefit per children actually increases by the number of children (up to three children, where it stays 
the same for additional children). For example, a family with three children receives 3.8 times higher benefit than a one-
child family. 
